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Twenty-Five Years of Deregulation: Lessons for
Electric Power
John E. Kwoka, Jr.*

I. INTRODUCTION

Twenty-five years ago, fully 17% of U.S. economic output derived
from heavily regulated industries.' At present no more than one-third of
that remains. 2 In the interim, a deregulation movement of the scope and
intensity that may even have surprised its advocates has swept through
the airline, brokerage services, telecommunications, trucking, railroads,
cable TV, banking, petroleum, and natural gas industries. Not all of
these industries have been completely deregulated. Some aspects of
telecom and railroads, for example, make that imprudent or simply
infeasible. Moreover, not all of these deregulatory experiences were
complete successes. Cable TV and banking are generally viewed as
problematic cases, but deregulation of virtually all industries has drawn
at least some criticism. Nonetheless, this movement-documented in
the list of deregulatory initiatives in Table 13-has resulted in a
sweeping transformation of industry in the U.S.
Noticeably absent from this list until recently, however, is electric
power. True, some incentive regulation has long been part of state
oversight of electricity, and the wholesale power market began to open
up after the passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
(PURPA) in 1978. But it has only been in the last few years that truly
deregulated markets for electric power have appeared in the U.S. One
might have expected this relatively late timing in one sense to be
advantageous: With a vast amount of prior experience with deregulation
in other industries, we should be well down the learning curve in terms
of devising good techniques for deregulation-techniques that are more
* Professor of Economics, Northeastern University, Research Fellow, American Antitrust
Institute.
1. Clifford Winston, Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists, 31 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1263, 1263 (1993).
2. Id.
3. See infra Appendix, Table 1: Major Economic Deregulatory Initiatives, 1971-1997.
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certain to produce benefits, less subject to manipulation, and with fewer
adverse effects. We might, in short, have expected a smooth transition
to successful deregulation.
That, of course, is not precisely how deregulation of electric power
has unfolded. There are at least three possible reasons for this
experience. First, the electric power sector has characteristics that make
it considerably more difficult to deregulate than other industries. These
characteristics are as follows:
* Electricity demand fluctuates constantly and unpredictably, while
the product cannot be inventoried.
* Aspects of the production process-notably, transmission and
distribution-remain a natural monopoly, and these require a
high degree of coordination with generation.
* The network is not a switched network but rather a fully
integrated system that must remain in electrical balance at all
times.
* Finally, there are significant external effects among agents
simultaneously using the transmission grid, that is, loop flow and
congestion issues.
No other industry with all of these characteristics has been
deregulated, and indeed, some observers have long cautioned that the
electric power sector is an uncertain case for deregulation.
The second reason that electricity deregulation has produced such
mixed results is that the industry's prior performance was not nearly as
problematic as in most other cases. Prices were not as far out of line
with costs as, say, in airlines. Nor was regulation obviously impeding
great technological change, as many suspected was the case in
telecommunications. The major efficiency gains expected in electric
power involve cost savings in investment and capacity planning at the
generation stage, and to a lesser degree in generation operation-all
expected to derive from enhanced competition among generators. Thus,
the gains have generally been viewed as longer-term, more modest, and
therefore more readily outweighed by any possible adverse
consequences that might occur.
Both of these reasons play important roles in our experience with and
expectations for electric power deregulation, but there is one additional
concern: The method for deregulating electric power itself may be
flawed, and in particular it may not fully reflect the lessons of past
experience with deregulation of other industries. The consequence may
therefore have been avoidable policy errors and unnecessary adverse
effects.
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Without minimizing the first two factors, here we focus on this third
issue. We begin with a brief review of two industries that illustrate
earlier phases of deregulation-airlines and telecommunications. These
will form the basis for a discussion of several lessons from deregulation
generally. Not all of these lessons are necessarily applicable to electric
power, but we shall return to the specific question of electricity
deregulation at the end.
II. DEREGULATION IN PRACTICE
No single industry or small number of industries can illustrate all
facets of deregulation. Here we examine an example of each of the two
major types of industries that have undergone deregulation, highlighting
important relevant aspects of their experiences. The first category is
that of fragmented, potentially competitive industries such as trucking,
airlines, and brokerage services. Because regulated rates in these
industries were generally above cost, 4 deregulation was an easy policy
choice, and it is not surprising that these industries underwent
deregulation first. Of these, we shall examine airlines. The second
category consists of industries with a significant structural monopoly
component, such as cable TV, telecom, and railroads. These industries
raise considerably more difficult issues, have undergone deregulation
somewhat later, and in many cases have been reformed with a
combination of deregulation where feasible and alternative regulation
where necessary.
We shall analyze the experience with
telecommunications.
A. Airlines
For decades, the airline industry was tightly regulated by the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB). CAB permitted no entry by new major
("trunk") carriers for decades, and approved only a small fraction of
applications for new service by existing carriers. The reason is that it
sought to preserve a non-cost-based structure of fares that produced a
patchwork of some very profitable routes and other unprofitable ones.
This system was designed to promote air service while maintaining the
financial viability of each carrier, but it was incompatible with free
entry and exit in the industry.
Beginning in the mid-1970s, CAB was prodded into loosening these
restrictions. It began to allow some entry by existing carriers onto

4. Natural gas was an exception. While this is a fragmented industry, regulation generally
held prices below the cost of marginal production.
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already served routes, followed by a grant of increasing discretion over
fares.
The Airline Deregulation Act of 19785 formalized and
accelerated this process. By 1979 carriers had complete freedom to
enter any route they wished. In 1980 CAB permitted unlimited
downward pricing flexibility and considerable upward flexibility. In
1983 the CAB lost all authority over fares, and in 1985 it ceased to exist
altogether. Its remaining functions-notably, data compilation and
merger review authority-were turned over to the Department of
Transportation.
The airline industry's experience under deregulation is usefully
broken down into the first ten years, and then the most recent fifteen or
so years. 6 A number of important effects emerged during the first
decade:
(Al) Average fares fell by approximately 20-25%. The declines
were greatest on long hauls and dense routes. The results of one
comparison of fares are shown in Figure 1.7
(A2) The number of carriers rose enormously. There were 43
certificated carriers in operation in 1978, but as shown in Table 2,8 over
the next ten years 135 new start-ups appeared. These new carriers
accounted for more than 16% of revenue passengers' miles by 1985.
(A3) Overall industry concentration fell, as did concentration on
particular routes. Route concentration measured by the numbersequivalent version of the Herfindahl index is shown in Figure 2. 9
(A4) Airlines vertically integrated into connecting routes and built
hubs to efficiently transfer passengers.
By the mid-1980s the airline industry had been transformed into a far
more competitive and efficient sector. The winners-in addition to
passengers-were smaller and newer carriers, whose gains came at the
expense of the traditional trunk airlines. A combination of factors,
however, reversed some of these gains during the following ten to
fifteen years. This second transformation was characterized by the
following:
5. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.
6. See Steven A. Morrison, Airline Service: The Evolution of Competition Since Deregulation,
in INDUSTRY STUDIES 147 (Larry L. Duetsch ed., 2d ed. 1998) (providing a good review of the
industry under deregulation).
7. See infra Appendix, Figure 1: Actual vs. "Regulated" Yield.
8. See infra Appendix, Table 2: Number of Large Certificated Air Carriers Providing Service.
9. See infra Appendix, Figure 2: Competition at the Route Level. The numbers equivalent is
the inverse of the numerical value of the Herfindahl index. It measures the number of equal size
firms that are implied by the calculated value of the Herfindahl, so that a larger value implies
lower concentration.
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(BI) Fare decreases ceased (see Figure 110) and fare dispersion rose,
as carriers increasingly employed yield management tools to better price
discriminate among passengers. What fare competition existed came
from lower-cost entrants.
(B2) The rate at which new entrants appeared declined substantially.
The number, which averaged sixteen per year between 1980 and 1985,
dropped to less than six per year in the second half of that decade. In
addition, a series of unchallenged mergers resulted in the elimination of
many independent carriers, so that industry and (to a lesser degree)
route concentration rose. These trends are evident in Table 211 and
Figure 2.12
(B3) Existing carriers countered the new entrants by creating
"fortress hubs" that were less vulnerable to entry and commanded
significant price premiums. They also employed computer reservation
systems, frequent flier programs, control of airport facilities, and
aggressive (allegedly anti-competitive) price responses to blunt
competition. 13
(B4) Congestion rose on several crucial parts of the system, notably
airport facilities, take-off and landing opportunities, and air traffic
control.
The result is that by the year 2000 the airline industry looks, behaves,
and performs far better than under regulation, but somewhat more
problematically than in the mid-1980s. Concerns are increasingly being
raised about mergers, industry concentration, higher entry barriers (both
natural and artificial), aggressive pricing, and congestion problems in
the system. The concerns manifest themselves in a steady stream of
proposals for intervention in the airline industry.
B. Telecommunications
The historical reason for regulation of telecommunications was the
natural monopoly character of both local exchange and interexchange
(long distance) services. Under Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) supervision, AT&T became the monopoly provider of both types
of service to most customers in the country. The overall level of rates

10. See infra Appendix, Figure 1: Actual vs. "Regulated" Yield.
11. See infra Appendix, Table 2: Number of Large Certificated Air Carriers Providing
Service.
12. See infra Appendix, Figure 2: Competition at the Route Level.
13. A good early discussion of these problems can be found in Michael E. Levine, Airline
Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON
REG. 393 (1987).
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was set to ensure an adequate rate of return, and individual rates were
set to be consistent with that level but were not otherwise necessarily
closely related to costs. Attracted by high margins in long distance and
utilizing new microwave technology, MCI and other companies sought
in the 1960s to offer competitive long distance service. They were
ultimately permitted to do so by the federal courts, only to encounter
vigorous opposition by AT&T. That opposition took forms that
prompted the federal government antitrust suit, of course, leading to the
1984 breakup of the company into a long distance business and several
local exchange monopolies.
At divestiture, it was expected that long distance would become a
competitive market in the near term, while bringing competition to the
local exchange would be a longer-term project. These two services
have had quite different subsequent experiences, both relevant to this
discussion. With respect to long distance:
(CI) Long distance rates have fallen dramatically, as shown in Table
3.14 Most of the decline is due to the reduction in access charges
mandated by the FCC, however, rather than to competitive pressures.
(C2) MCI and Sprint have grown to significant size while AT&T's
share has declined from 90% at divestiture to 38% at present (see Table
4). 15 The number of other long distance carriers has increased, first as
pure resellers began operation, and more recently as vast amounts of
new and cheap fiber capacity are being leased by upstart long distance
providers.
(C3) Cost-of-service regulation for AT&T was replaced in 1989 by
price caps. In the belief that competition was becoming sufficiently
vigorous, most price cap controls were themselves removed in stages so
that by 1993 virtually the entire industry was deregulated.
(C4) Price competition increasingly comes from so-called "dialaround" companies plus wireless carriers and some prospect of cable
and Internet telephony. AT&T, MCI WorldCom, and Sprint no longer
find the long distance business profitable and attractive, and have
sought merger partners. 16
Divestiture turned the local exchanges over to the seven regional Bell
Operating Companies (BOCs). Because the local exchange has natural
14. See infra Appendix, Table 3: Long Distance Telecommunications Industry Statistics.
15. See infra Appendix, Table 4: Share of Total Toll Service Revenues-Long Distance
Carriers Only.
16. Indeed, MCI WorldCom itself sought to merge with Sprint, though it abandoned that
attempt in the face of threatened opposition by the Justice Department. AT&T has failed to find a
suitable merger partner and is seeking a virtual exit strategy from the industry.
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monopoly properties, regulatory reform rather than deregulation has
been the policy. Experience to date is instructive:
(DI) The BOCs have maintained nearly complete control of their
local exchange monopoly (see Table 5). 17 This is due to a combination
of high cost of entry and aggressive, allegedly anti-competitive, actions
taken by the incumbent BOCs to impede entrants.
(D2) Price competition for local exchange customers, with the
exception of some high volume businesses, scarcely exists.
(D3) The BOCs have long sought to enter the long distance market,
raising the risk of possible misuse of their local exchange dominance
(analogous to actions by the old AT&T). Nevertheless, the BOCs have
now received approval to provide long distance service in a growing
number of states.
(D4) The Telecommunications Act of 199618 sought to stimulate
entry into the local exchange in several ways, but none have really
worked. Instead, the Act spawned a series of mergers, including among
the BOCs themselves.
Deregulation of both long distance and local telecommunications
presents a greater challenge than the fragmented-industry case analyzed
previously. Nonetheless, many would probably view the results in the
long distance market as reasonably successful, because a market with
several significant sellers has replaced the constraint of regulation.
With respect to the local exchange-always a tougher case-efforts to
get the same process underway have failed, as little entry has occurred
and incumbent domination is largely intact.
III. EIGHT LESSONS OF-AND FOR-DEREGULATION
The above case studies are intended to illustrate two major types of
deregulated industries-one, a fragmented and potentially competitive
industry where all that seems necessary is the removal of regulation, the
other an industry with significant residual monopoly aspects
representing a more challenging case for reform. By themselves, of
course, these two industries do not capture all past experience with
deregulation. In what follows, we draw on a wide range of experiences
from these and other industries in order to extract some lessons from
past reform that should be helpful for further deregulation.

17. See infra Appendix, Table 5: Share of Local Service Revenues.
18. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended
at 47 U.S.C. § 609 (Supp. 11 1996)).
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A. LESSON 1: Entry Should Be Deregulated Before Prices
Many regulated markets are characterized by above-cost prices
together with restrictions on entry of additional sellers. In such cases,
deregulation that begins by permitting pricing discretion to incumbents
will result in higher prices as existing firms take full advantage of their
market power. While this market power may only be temporary,
conferring even temporary profit windfalls on incumbent firms is poor
public policy. Deregulation should instead first permit entry to occur,
after which pricing discretion may safely be granted since it will be
constrained by the existence of more numerous and aggressive new
sellers.
Good examples of industries where entry has been deregulated first
include airlines (as discussed above) and trucking. The Motor Carrier
Act of 1980 mandated the rapid removal of impediments to entry
together with gradually increasing pricing flexibility as competition was
judged by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to be
strengthening.' 9 By contrast, in the case of air freight, price and entry
were deregulated more or less simultaneously and without due attention
to the development of competition. Air cargo rates escalated rapidly
upon deregulation in 1975, and remained high until sufficient entry
occurred.
B. LESSON 2: Competition Comes from Entrants; Ensure that Entry
Actually Occurs
Post-deregulation competition can generally be traced to new entrants
rather than to the sudden competitiveness of incumbent firms. This is
clearly the case for telecommunications, cable TV, and other industries
with small numbers of incumbents, but even in fragmented industries
such as airlines, new entrants are by far the most powerful source of
competition. As a result, it is important actually to have new companies
enter the market. For many reasons, simply permitting entry is not the
same as actually having entry. Prospective entrants may be reluctant to
enter an industry where there is an entrenched incumbent. Lenders may
not be eager to support start-ups. The know-how necessary to enter a
well-established business may be in short supply. And even if entry
does occur, entry takes some time and consumers may not respond
immediately to alternatives. Such impediments handicapped early
efforts of MCI and Sprint to compete with AT&T in long distance

19. Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. § 10101 (1994)).
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telecom. Analogous difficulties are being encountered by competitive
local exchange carriers as they confront the BOCs. Cable TV illustrates
faulty reliance upon a belief in competition from satellite and other
wireless cable alternatives. In each of these cases the absence of actual
competition-regardless of enhanced opportunity to enter-has allowed
incumbent sellers to more fully exploit their pricing power.
In some instances, non-incumbent firms as well as new entrants may
exert significant competitive force. 20 Firms poised to enter the market
or perceived as likely to enter may constrain the market power of
incumbents. An extreme form of this argument is represented by the
theory of contestability, which contends that the number of actual
competitors is irrelevant so long as entry is perfectly free. Both of these
arguments are subject to misuse. While as pure theory contestability is
unobjectionable, there is no market where the facts comport with its
assumptions. As for non-incumbent competition, advocates have
advanced this argument where entry prospects are merely speculative,
seeking premature deregulation.
C. LESSON 3: Be Wary of Markets Where Entrants Do Not Survive
Even where entry does occur, there remains the question of whether
entrants actually survive. If they do not, there are two possible
explanations that may cause some concern. First, it may be that the
market has higher scale economies than envisioned and is not a
candidate for structural fragmentation. In this case a major premise of
deregulation may be false, requiring rethinking the strategy for reform
and perhaps also its very rationale. The second reason that entrants may
not survive is that incumbents may soon figure out how to counterattack
and drive them out. If this is the case, greater vigilance from antitrust
and other policies is logically required.
It should be noted that the demise of some entrants is quite normal.
Not all entrants are expected to survive, only those who prove to be
competitive in costs, products, marketing, management, etc. The surge
of entry at the outset of deregulation in airlines and other industries, for
example, is not inconsistent with economic models of the evolution of
essentially new industries, which eventually settle down into some more
stable configuration. 2 1 But it is also clear, for example, that smaller

20. For full discussion, see John E. Kwoka, Non-Incumbent Competition: Mergers Involving
Constraining and Prospective Competitors, 52 CASE W. RES. L.sREV. 173 (2001) (paper
presented at the American Antitrust Institute conference, Washington, D.C., June 2001).
21. See Boyan Jovanovic & Glenn M. MacDonald, The Life Cycle of a Competitive Industry,
102 J. POL. ECON. 322 (1994).
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upstart carriers have often been driven from airline markets by
aggressive, allegedly predatory pricing by incumbents. The result has
been fewer carriers on many routes than otherwise would have arisen.
Indeed, it is striking-even worrisome-that airline competition at
present largely derives from a single carrier, Southwest, raising concern
about the true strength of competition in these markets.
D. LESSON 4: Deregulate as Quickly as Possible
Gradualism has generally characterized transitions to deregulation,
because it provides both consumers and policy-makers valuable time to
adjust. In addition, it reflects normal, seemingly prudent caution in
making fundamental changes to an industry. But an incremental
approach has significant disadvantages as well. It requires formulating
a whole series of steps correctly, not necessarily an easier task than
determining the comparative statics of "flash-cut" deregulation.
Moreover, while change inevitably favors certain parties at the expense
of others, gradualism provides a better opportunity for all of them to
organize and press for administrative and regulatory decisions that work
to their advantage. The factors that determine optimum speed,
therefore, are whether or not there are reliable analyses and predictions
of the final outcome of the process, and whether or not consumers and
companies are likely to be able to undertake adjustments with relative
ease.
Experience with faster deregulation has generally been superior to
that with slower phased-in reforms. For example, for twenty-five years
the telecom industry has been undergoing reform in a seemingly endless
series of small conditional steps. Throughout this time, parties to the
process have engaged in nonstop lobbying for regulatory and
administrative advantage. Airline deregulation was much faster, of
course, but interestingly, Alfred Kahn, widely regarded as its driving
force, came to advocate a yet speedier process. He concluded that even
the few years over which airlines were freed up provided too much
opportunity for self-serving efforts by the parties to distort the process,
efforts that were difficult for the agencies to resolve but which they
were obliged to address. 22 In short, where the decision to deregulate has
been made, "big bang" deregulation is the preferred approach.

22. Alfred E. Kahn, Applications of Economics to an Imperfect World, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 1,
7-10 (1979). For further discussion of this and some related points, see Darius W. Gaskins, Jr. &
James M. Voytko, Managing the Transition to Deregulation,44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9
(1981).
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E. LESSON 5: Minimize Uncertaintyand Opportunitiesfor Strategic
Behavior
Ambiguities about important features of the deregulation plan, its
timetable, or any interim stages create two types of problems. First,
ambiguities wreak havoc on parties' strategies, undermine lenders'
confidence, and may even create doubts about the final outcome. The
efficiency of the process is enhanced to the degree that a "plan certain"
is in place-even one that may be slightly imperfect. A second concern
with ambiguity is that, as with gradualism, it is likely to induce efforts
by the parties to strive to resolve such ambiguity in their own favor.
Simply put, the more that can be specified ex ante, the less there is the
corresponding opportunity for strategic interference in the process.
Ambiguity and uncertainty create no social benefits and should be
avoided.
Related to this are the risks of distortion and delay by incumbents
where deregulation involves interactions between incumbents and
entrants. After all, most reforms adversely affect dominant incumbent
firms, and they cannot be expected to acquiesce in their demise or in
any way to act against their own interests. In markets such as railroads
and telecom where new entrants must interact with
incumbents-securing interconnection, interline agreements,
etc.-incumbents will predictably use those opportunities to distort and
delay the process to their own advantage wherever possible. Good
regulatory reform should therefore rely to the maximum degree possible
on objective criteria and fixed deadlines, with little or no administrative
discretion to alter them and stiff penalties for parties' failure to comply.
This will force the parties to focus on preparing for the deregulated
market, rather than seeking to thwart it.
F. LESSON 6: Anticipate Secondary Effects; Be Preparedfor Further,
Unexpected Consequences
Most regulated markets traditionally are characterized by modest and
fairly predictable changes in demand and cost. By contrast, the very
nature of an unregulated market brings with it less predictable shifts in
overall demand and its composition as well as changes in cost and
technology. Demand changes in particular are likely to put pressure on
complementary goods and services, that is, those for which demand
rises in tandem. Airlines illustrate the case where infrastructure
constraints have been encountered as demand has grown. The result has
been congested airports, overburdened air traffic control, and the loss of
some of the anticipated benefits from deregulation. There is no good

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 33

reason for the failure to anticipate and provide adequately for these
related goods and services.
That is not to say, however, that all of the effects of deregulation can
be foreseen with clarity and certainty. It has been noted, for example,
that economics has a very good record in predicting the price effects of
deregulation, but a much poorer one in anticipating changes in nonprice outcomes, induced production changes, and new technologies. 23 It
is therefore essential that the deregulatory process be sufficiently
flexible and attentive to accommodate these less predictable
consequences.
G. LESSON 7: Careful Residual Regulation May Be Necessary
Too often deregulation is seen as simply the antithesis of regulation,
so that what passes for deregulation is simply the elimination of
regulatory constraints. While that may be an appropriate model for
structurally fragmented industries, others with some natural monopoly
or bottleneck properties will generally require residual regulation to
control market power. Where necessary, such residual regulation
should not be viewed with hostility. Indeed, avoidance of necessary
regulation may jeopardize the benefits of deregulation elsewhere in the
industry.
Moreover, the design of residual regulation often receives only
secondary, grudging attention. It lacks the ideological and practical
purity of full deregulation, and hence does not have the same appeal. It
is, however, essential that residual regulation be crafted with the same
care as full deregulation, and indeed with attention to many of the same
principles. For example, residual regulation should take the loosest,
most market-oriented form that is possible. It should be designed so as
to minimize opportunities for strategic behavior by the parties. And it
should have clear goals, a review process, and a time horizon that will
maximize chances of success. The FCC's price cap plan for AT&T is
an example of a particularly careful approach, 4 but most others have
fallen short.

23. Winston, supra note 1, at 1276. Kahn has gone so far as to state that the ultimate
argument for deregulation is the very fact that its results cannot be fully predicted-that is, we do
not know what is being sacrificed under regulation until we turn firms loose. See Kahn, supra
note 22, at 6.
24. For a description, see John E. Kwoka, Jr., Implementing Price Caps in
Telecommunications, 12 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 726-52 (1993).
From personal
involvement in the design of price caps at the FCC, I might note that we constantly put ourselves
in the position of the price-capped company and asked how we might be able to game the system
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H. LESSON 8: Avoid Creating or EnhancingMarket Power;
Strengthen Antitrust Oversight

The essential purpose of deregulation is to replace the constraint of
regulation with the constraint of market competition. There is scarcely
a greater irony, then, than when deregulation instead unleashes, or even
creates, market power. Such has occurred where deregulation has been
premature or too sweeping or simply too optimistic about its effects.
Cable TV and some aspects of telecom deregulation arguably fall into
this category. In airlines and railroads, among other industries, pricing
freedom and merger opportunities have enhanced market power under
deregulation. In some instances the initial deregulation plan has been
modified in response, while in other cases there has been no
response-just a process of waiting out the adverse effects of market
power. Far better, of course, would be initial deregulation that is more
mindful of the potential for market power.
Where successful, deregulation is intended to permit an industry to
operate as any other unregulated industry of the sort that dominates the
economy. It is natural to expect, then, that such industries would be
overseen by antitrust in exactly the same manner as any other
unregulated industry. Unfortunately, that has not always been the case.
When the CAB expired, merger oversight was transferred to the
Department of Transportation (DOT) rather than to the Justice
Department at the behest of airlines who anticipated a more favorable
hearing from DOT. Their efforts were rewarded when DOT approved
every one of the twenty-one airline mergers proposed between 1983 and
1987, resulting in the previously noted reconcentration of the industry.
When the ICC ceased operation, rail merger authority went to the new
Surface Transportation Board (STB). Railroads rightly expected a more
lenient antitrust review, as was indeed the case for the major-and
calamitous-rail mergers of the late 1990s. 25 Transferring merger and
other antitrust authority to non-antitrust agencies-agencies that are
predisposed to the industry itself and which lack relevant expertise-is
tantamount to carving out an antitrust exemption and should not be
approved.
A further consequence of progressive deregulation-documented by
the growing fraction of the economy that falls in this category-is the
to our advantage. In this fashion we sought to devise definitions and operating rules that could
not be strategically e.. loited so as to defeat the purpose of the plan.
25. The STB has now modified its merger guidelines, but its changes are neither timely nor
adequate. See Letter from J. Kwoka & L. White, on behalf of the American Antitrust Institute, to
Linda Morgan, Chairman, Surface Transportation Board (Nov. 2000) (on file with author).
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increased need for antitrust scrutiny. Whereas regulation sharply
limited mergers and pricing discretion, placing these companies in free
markets predictably results in actions requiring normal oversight.
Accordingly, one might expect resources for the Department of Justice
and Federal Trade Commission to rise in tandem with deregulation. A
statistical study of antitrust resources during the period 1970 to 1997
shows, however, that the total budgets of the antitrust agency vary in the
same direction as the percent of the economy that is subject to
regulation. 26 That is, as regulation has receded, DOJ and FTC budgets
have declined rather than increased. Policy-makers apparently view
antitrust as complementary to regulation, whereas the logic of these
policies would make them substitutes.
Finally, the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
need to be better prepared to deal with newly deregulated industries.
Those industries are often characterized by an initial burst of mergers
and pricing and other strategies that raise significant antitrust questions.
The agencies operate under the obvious handicap of having no prior
analytical experience with the industry and no benchmark of
competitive performance in it. The result is that agency caution leads to
a permissive posture toward mergers and practices, especially in the
initial years and cases. Because that is the formative period of an
industry in transition, there may be long-lasting consequences of agency
inaction.
For example, allegations of predatory conduct against People
Express, Laker Airways, and other airlines during the 1980s went
largely unheeded, and they went out of business. 27 Years of analysis of
alleged abuses of computer reservations systems during the 1980s
resulted in no action by the Justice Department, although some of these
concerns were later (and only partially) addressed by the Transportation
Department. More recently, the first merger of two BOCs-that
between Bell Atlantic and Nynex-was approved by the Department of
Justice. Although it was more aggressively reviewed by the FCC, 28 the
26. John E. Kwoka, Commitment to Competition: An Assessment of Antitrust Agency Budgets
Since 1970, 14 REV. INDUS. ORG. 295 (1999).
27. The first Department of Justice suit alleging predatory pricing in airlines-United States v.
American Airlines-was filed in 1999, more than twenty years after deregulation. United States
v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kan. 2001). It was dismissed by the trial judge. Id. at
1219.
28. FCC reviews of the BOC mergers provide an example of innovative methodology that
may usefully be devised for such matters. In order to characterize firms that were previously
denied the opportunity to compete simply because of regulation, the FCC advanced the concept
of a "precluded competitor." This better reflected their economic status and avoided the baggage
associated with "potential entrants" in non-regulated settings.
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DOJ response was widely seen as an encouraging signal that other BOC
mergers might be approved, as indeed they were. Because these
episodes constitute important junctures in the evolution of these
industries, it is all the more important that the agencies be prepared for
novel issues and novel factual contexts, and that they be aggressive in
preventing those mergers and practices that might have long-lasting
harms.
Kahn once said that "nothing is going to discredit deregulation more
quickly and thoroughly than a failure of the government to enforce the
antitrust and consumer protection laws," as well as to pursue other
supportive policies.2 9 The history of deregulation is laced with
altogether too many proofs of his prediction.
IV. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON ELECTRIC POWER
DEREGULATION

While this is not the place for a full evaluation of deregulation of
electric power, it is appropriate to draw some connections between the
lessons set out above and the manner in which electricity deregulation
has been implemented.
As in our reviews of airlines and
telecommunications, we begin with some observations about prices and
entry.
Electricity deregulation in the U.S. has been accompanied virtually
everywhere by retail price increases, not the promised reductions in
costs and prices. While there are multiple causes, Table 630 shows that
industrial retail prices in many regions increased by 25% or more
between 1999 and 2001.31 The Pacific states faced a 59% price rise, led
by an 84% price rise in California just between 2000 and 2001. In
addition, over the past three years there have been well-documented
wholesale price spikes in the Midwest, California, and to a lesser degree
New York. Spot prices have briefly gone as high as $10,000 per mwh,
compared to their historic average of $30-50 per mwh.
Generation markets have undergone major structural change. Many
states, including California, have required divestiture of generation
assets by their investor-owned utilities, but in many cases the bulk of
those assets have been acquired by a handful of major power
firms-AES, Dynegy, Duke, Entergy, Reliant, and Southern. Fully
29. Alfred E. Kahn, I Would Do It Again, REGULATION, 1988 No. 2, at 22, 28.
30. See infra Appendix, Table 6: Average Price of Electric Power.
31. Residential prices rose about one-third as much as industrial prices, due to various
residential price freezes and a regulatory determination to minimize adverse effects on those
customers.
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80% of divested generation capacity has been acquired by subsidiaries
of other utilities, with the ten largest now controlling half of national
capacity. 32 On the other hand, some entry by independent power
producers and wider regional power trading areas have at least partially
offset this rising concentration.
Experience with electric power deregulation suggests the following
observations:
" Prices have shown considerable flexibility, whereas firm numbers
have not changed much. This suggests an inadequate degree of
entry prior to the grant of pricing discretion to dominant
incumbents. The result has been enhancement of market power
33
and anti-competitive price increases.
* Transmission constraints have fragmented wider, apparently
competitive markets into pockets of transient monopoly.
Although these constraints were well understood prior to
deregulation, 34 their implications for deregulation itself seem to
have been overlooked. The result has been the creation-or at
least unleashing--of temporary, but substantial, market power.
* Market rules in California and elsewhere have permitted
individual sellers with significant shares of the market to
35
unilaterally raise prices by strategically withholding capacity.
This "hit-and-run market power" reflects poor design of key
institutions required for deregulated markets and a failure to
anticipate how a particular set of rules could be gamed.

32. DR. MARK N. COOPER, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, RECONSIDERING
ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING: Do MARKET PROBLEMS INDICATE A SHORT CIRCUIT OR A
TOTAL BLACKOUT? 13 (Nov. 2000), available at http://www.consumersunion.org/telecom/
deregdc I1OO.htm.
33. Studies documenting such market power in California include S. Borenstein, J. Bushnell,
& F. Wolak, Diagnosing Market Power in California's Deregulated Wholesale Electricity Market,
POWER Working Paper PWP-064 (1999); and in the PJM market area, R. Tucker, Measuring
Market Performance in Restructured Electricity Markets: An Empirical Analysis of the PJM
Energy Market (2001) (Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington University). For analogous
effects in the U.K., see Catherine D. Wolfram, Measuring Duopoly Power in the British
Electricity Spot Market, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 805 (1999).
34. See, e.g., Richard Schmalensee & Bennett W. Golub, Estimating Effective Concentration
in Deregulated Wholesale ElectricityMarkets, 15 RAND J. ECON. 12 (1984).
35. John E. Kwoka, Jr., Unilateral Withholding: Market Power and California's Electricity
Crisis, George Washington University Center for Economic Research Discussion Paper 01-01
(May 2001) (providing an analysis). Recently, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) singled out AES, Entergy, and Southern for their "pivotal" role in pricing, defined as
having at least some capacity that must be used to meet peak demand. Order on Triennial Market
Power Updates and Announcing New, Interim Generation Market Power Screen and Mitigation
Policy, 97 F.E.R.C. T 61,219, 2001 FERC LEXIS 2788, at *16-*18 (2001).

2002]

*

Twenty-Five Years of Deregulation

Numerous mergers between distribution companies, and between
electric and gas utilities, are transforming the industry. The
FERC has reviewed sixty major merger applications since 1995,
after decades with little such activity. While combinations of
distribution companies raise different issues than the
consolidation of generation assets, it is by no means clear that the
former will result in greater efficiency or competitiveness.
In summary, then, it would seem that some features of electric power
deregulation do not reflect what has been learned during the quarter
century of experience with deregulation of other industries in this
country. While several factors have contributed to problems in the
electricity sector, greater attention to entry issues, to the design of
institutions, and to opportunities for market power would have
significantly blunted the adverse effects visited upon residential
consumers, businesses, and state governments. Perhaps it is the case
that electricity deregulation holds less promise than anticipated, but
failure is assured if the lessons of past experience are not heeded in
going forward with deregulation of this critical sector.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

902

[Vol. 33

Appendix
TABLE 1: MAJOR ECONOMIC DEREGULATORY INITIATIVES,
Year

Initiative

1971
1972
1975
1976

Specialized Common Carrier Decision (FCC)
Domestic satellite open skies policy (FCC)
Abolition of fixed brokerage fees (SEC)
Railroad Revitalization and Reform Act

1977

Air Cargo Deregulation Act
Airline Deregulation Act
Natural Gas Policy Act

1978
1979
1980

1971-1997*

Deregulation of satellite earth stations (FCC)
Urgent-mail exemption (Postal Service)
Motor Carrier Reform Act
Household Goods Transportation Act

1981

Staggers Rail Act
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
International Air Transportation Competition Act
Deregulation of cable television (FCC)
Deregulation of customer premises equipment & enhanced services (FCC)
Decontrol of crude oil and refined petroleum products (executive order)

1982

Deregulation of radio (FCC)
Bus Regulatory Reform Act

1984

Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act
AT&T settlement
Space commercialization

1986
1987
1988
1989
1991
1992

1993
1994
1995
1996

Cable Television Deregulation Act
Shipping Act
Trading of airport landing rights
Sale of Conrail
Elimination of fairness doctrine (FCC)
Proposed rules on natural gas and electricity (FERC)
Proposed rules on price caps (FCC)
Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
Energy Policy Act
FERC Order 636
Elimination of state regulation of cellular telephone rates
Negotiated Rates Act
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
Trucking Industry and Regulatory Reform Act
ICC Termination Act
Telecommunications Act

FERC Order 888
W. KIP ViSCUSi, ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST (3d ed. 2000).
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Appendix
TABLE 2:
NUMBER OF LARGE CERTIFICATED AIR CARRIERS PROVIDING SERVICE*

Year

At End of
Previous Year

New Carriers
Added

Carriers
Deleted

At End of
Current Year

* Copyright © 1998 by M.E. Sharpe, Inc. Steven A. Morrison, "Airline Service: The Evolution of
Competition Since Deregulation," in Larry L. Duetsch, ed., Industry Studies, Second Edition
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 15 5 . Reprinted with permission.
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Appendix
TABLE

3: LONG DISTANCE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY STATISTICS*

Year

Industry Average
Revenue Per Minute ($)

Per Minute Access
Charge ($)

1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

0.32
0.31
0.28
0.25
0.23

0.173
0.162
0.14
0.115
0.106

1989

0.22

0.091

1990
1991
1992

0.20
0.20
0.19

0.075
0.07
0.068

1993
1994
1995
1996

0.19
0.18
0.17
0.16

0.067
0.069
0.062
0.06

1997
1998

0.15
0.14

0.052
0.038

1999

0.14

0.028

Note: National average estimated in July of each year
* Federal Communications Commission, Statisticsof the Long Distance
Telecommunications Industry, this. 12 & 15, Jan. 2001.

[Vol. 33

Twenty-Five Years of Deregulation

2002]

Appendix
TABLE

4: SHARE OF TOTAL TOLL SERVICE REVENUESLONG DISTANCE CARRIERS ONLY (%)*

Year

AT&T

MCI WorldCom

Sprint

All Other
Long Distance Carriers

1984

90.1

4.5

2.7

2.6

1985
1986
1987
1988

86.3
81.9
78.6
74.6

5.5
7.6
8.8
10.3

2.6
4.3
5.8
7.2

5.6
6.3
6.8
8

1989

67.5

12.3

8.4

11.8

1990

65

14.5

9.7

10.8

1991
1992
1993

63.2
60.8
58.1

15.6
18.1
19.7

9.9
9.7
10

11.3
11.5
12.3

1994
1995
1996

55.2
51.8
47.9

20.7
24.6
25.4

10.1
9.8
9.7

14
13.8
17

1997
1998
1999

43.8
43.1
40.5

25.7
23.5
23.7

9.5
8.5
9.8

19.8
24.9
26

2000

38

22.5

9

30.5

* Federal Communications Commission, Trends in Telephone Service, tbl. 10.8, Aug. 2001.
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Appendix
TABLE

5:

SHARE OF LOCAL SERVICE REVENUES (%)*

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

73.6

72.9

72.4

73.1

71.5

69.6

70.3

26. 1

26.7

26.8

25.9

26.2

26.9

23.9

99.7

99.6

99.3

99

97.7

96.5

94.2

0.2

0.3

0.7

1

1.6

2.4

4.1

NA
0.1

NA
0

NA
0.1

NA
0.1

0.2
0.4

0.3
0.8

0.5
1.2

0.3

0.4

0.7

1

2.3

3.5

5.8

Share of Local Service Revenues
Incumbent LECs
Bell Operating Companies
Other Incumbent LECs
Total
Local Service Competitors
CAPs & CLECs
Local Resellers, Shared Tenant,
Private Carriers, & Other Local
All Other Carriers
Total

* Federal Communications Commission, Trends in Telephone Service, tbl. 9.6, Aug. 2001.
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TABLE

6: AVERAGE PRICE OF ELECTRIC POWER*
(cents per kilowatt hour)
Residential

Industrial

1999

2001

% Change

1999

2001

New England

11.2

12.4

10.7

7.4

9.6

29.7

Mid-Atlantic

11.8

12.3

4.2

5.2

6.4

23.1

E. North Central

8.5

8.6

1.2

4.8

4.8

-

W. North Central

8.0

8.1

1.3

5.0

5.0

-

% Change

South Atlantic

8.0

8.5

6.3

4.6

4.7

2.2

E. South Central

6.5

6.7

3.1

4.4

4.2

(4.5)

W. South Central

7.8

8.8

12.8

4.2

5.4

28.6

Mountain

7.6

8.1

6.6

4.6

5.1

10.9

Pacific

9.1

9.8

7.7

4.9

7.8

59.2

10.8

11.8

9.3

7.5

10.5

40.0

8.5

8.9

4.7

4.8

5.4

17.5

California
U.S.

Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Monthly, tbl. 53,
Oct. 2000; and tbl. 53, Oct. 2001.
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Appendix
FIGURE

1:

ACTUAL VS. "REGULATED" YIELD*

,"Regulated"

Yield

YEAR
Note: Yield refers to revenue per passenger mile.
* Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, The Dynamics of Airline Pricingand Competition,
AM. ECO. REV., May 1990, at 389, 389.
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Appendix
FIGURE

2: COMPETITION AT THE ROUTE LEVEL*
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* Copyright

© 1998 by M.E. Sharpe, Inc. Steven A. Morrison, "Airline Service: The Evolution of

Competition Since Deregulation," in Larry L. Duetsch, ed., Industry Studies, Second Edition
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 158. Reprinted with permission.

